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Under the “Dormant Commerce Clause” of the United States Constitution,
states are generally not permitted to discriminate against—treat differently —
identical or “like” products solely based on where the product was
produced or manufactured. For example, Massachusetts cannot impose a
higher tax or greater marketing restrictions on Vermont-produced milk
than it does on Massachusetts-produced milk solely because the Vermont
milk was produced in Vermont. Similarly, under international trade law,
discrimination by one nation against like products produced by another
nation is generally impermissible.
But when are products “alike”? A key question in any Dormant
Commerce Clause dispute is whether a product is really the same as, really
identical to, or like, the product that allegedly is receiving relatively favored
treatment. If Vermont and Massachusetts milk are like products, then, as
a matter of precedent and logic, courts should scrutinize and generally
invalidate efforts by Massachusetts to impose greater taxes or marketing
restrictions on Vermont milk than on Massachusetts milk. But if Vermont
milk is not a like product, if it is different from Massachusetts milk in
material ways that implicate the state police power to protect health and
welfare, then even facial discrimination against Vermont milk may be
justified, and a more deferential, nuanced, and measured form of judicial
review is appropriate.
In this Article, we argue that what constitutes a like product for Dormant
Commerce Clause purposes should be seen through a climate change lens.
Without the climate change lens, some products may appear alike that are
actually different in ways that directly implicate traditional state police
power concerns. Lower federal courts have not yet embraced what we call
the climate change lens. However, very few cases involving climatechange-related state legislation have been litigated, and there is indication
in at least one recent federal appellate court decision that a climate change
lens may be viable.
Our goal here is two-fold: first, to show that a climate change lens can
make us understand that some apparently discriminatory state treatment
of like products is in fact differential treatment of different products, and,
second, that there is precedential basis for courts adopting the climate
change lens and hence a more deferential posture toward state climate
change initiatives.
We are focused on two kinds of state initiatives. The first is, as in
California’s low carbon fuel standard, when a state assigns a cost of
carbon to a fuel based on lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, with the
near inevitable result that otherwise identical fuels produced far away and
out-of-state will have a higher assigned carbon cost than fuels produced instate. The second is, as in a number of state Renewable Portfolio
Standards (RPSSs), where a state requires or incentivizes the satisfaction

70

BARSA-DANA(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

[VOL. 5: 69, 2013–14]

10/6/2016 8:58 AM

A Climate Change Lens
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

of the RPS by renewable fuel production in the state rather than through
sole reliance on imports. Viewed outside the climate change lens, both
these situations involve discrimination against like products. Viewed
through a climate change lens, they do not. The climate change lens—
and whether courts choose to see through it—matters a great deal.
We view this lens as having three aspects. First, the GHG, and hence
climate change, impact of any product depends on the lifecycle emissions
associated with the product. A state’s residents do not confront merely an
ideological or philosophical problem in climate change. It is instead a
tangible—and for some states existential—problem in terms of the
economic and environmental impacts associated with such fundamental
health and welfare issues as coastal flooding, drought, wildfires, and
invasive species. A court should understand that the lifecycle emissions
of a product directly implicates traditional state police power concerns
and in that sense should be understood as an integral characteristic of the
product. Thus, ethanol from Ohio is not the same product as ethanol from
California. California’s use of the Ohio ethanol means more net GHG
emissions and a greater likelihood of real, material climate change impacts in
California that will have impacts on the material circumstances of the lives
of Californians. We believe this part of the climate change lens finds support
in, even flows from, the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA.
Second, energy produced in–state is not necessarily the same, or a like
product, as energy produced elsewhere and then imported because the
production itself may have consequences for the environment within the
state and hence for the health and welfare of state residents. When a state
requires or incentivizes the production of a non-polluting renewable source
within a state to meet part of state energy needs, a corresponding amount
of dirtier, polluting energy production within the state is much more likely
to cease as a consequence. Thus, imported wind power is different, and
is an unlike product, to locally required or incentivized wind power
because a characteristic of the latter, but not the former, is that the former
delivers a reduction in local air pollutants and consequent reduction in
harms associated with local air pollutants.
Third, local energy is a different product seen from a climate change
lens because it is more robust with respect to climate-change-related
interferences with transport and transmission—interferences from such
things as extreme weather. This part of the climate change lens one might
call a climate change adaptation lens.
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What would it mean if courts were to adopt the climate change lens?
It would not mean that automatically all climate change or other
environmentally-oriented state legislation would be upheld where
distinctions were made between in-state and out-of-state products.
Instead, the lens would free up courts not to impose the near strict scrutiny of
“facially discriminatory” state legislation that has dominated much of the
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It would allow the courts to
engage in a more contextual, and more deferential, but not toothless,
review—a balancing test that courts routinely use to decide Dormant
Commerce Clause cases where discrimination does not amount to simple
economic protectionism.
We point to two models, or at least inspirations for such review. The
first is the World Trade Organization’s decisions in the tuna-dolphin and
shrimp-turtle line of decisions. The second is the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in United Haulers, which, we argue, comes close to
endorsing a contextual, more deferential review. Of course what we
propose here, the adoption of the climate change lens, certainly would
require an extension of, and not just a simple application of United
Haulers. Still, United Haulers’ embrace of a broader market participant
exception and traditional government function exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause plus its express invocation of policy rationales that
move the Dormant Commerce Clause closer to a sensible protectionismsfocused substantive review rather than a reflexive form of strict scrutiny
provides a good beginning place for moving forward.
In Part I we trace the Dormant Commerce Clause pre-Haulers and
explain the California treatment of out-of-state energy sources and RPSS’
preferences and requirements for in-state renewable production and
explain why such state measures are subject to being invalidated, at least
under pre-Haulers case law (and perhaps even now too).
In Part II, we explore the climate change lens and its three aspects: the
product as not alike because product use may have differential local climate
change effects; the product as not alike because in-state renewable
production that displaces in-state non-renewable production has local
environmental effects regarding conventional pollutants; and the product
as not alike because local energy is more climate change adaptive than
imported energy.
In Part III, we argue that adopting judicial adoption of the climate
change and more deferential review finds support in evolving WTO law
and relatively recent Supreme Court decisions.
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I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard and
State RPS Requirements
Several states have enacted laws that attempt to reduce the carbon
intensity of fuels burned in that state. In California, for example, the Low
Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) has as its stated goal to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.1 Pursuant to this law, the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted an LCFS in June 2007. The
purpose of the LCFS is “to implement a low carbon fuel standard, which
will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the full fuel-cycle,
carbon intensity of the transportation fuel used in California.”2
California’s LCFS estimates carbon emissions related to a fuel’s lifecycle,
including extraction, refining, and transportation, and establishes different
standards for gasoline and diesel fuels, to reduce the carbon intensity of
fuel by 10% by the year 2020.3 Each fuel4 is assigned a “carbon intensity
value.”5 These “carbon intensity values” differ depending on the location of
the fuel’s production, among other factors, with generally more favorable
scores assigned to California production than to Midwest production, in
part to account for transportation costs. CARB estimated that the effects
of this law would include a reduction in the volume of fuel imported from
other states, and increased California production of biofuels, which would
increase employment in the state.6
Similarly, state RPS requirements “require[] all retail utilities in a given
state to prove that a set percentage of its total commercially available
supply is derived from renewable energy resources.”7 The rub is that
“[s]everal state RPSs include in-state delivery or location requirements
and incentives, while other states limit the amount of out-of-state power
that a utility may use to satisfy the RPS. In addition, some states “carve1. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38501 (West 2007).
2. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480.
3. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95482(b), (c).
4. Fuels include gasoline, ethanol from corn, ethanol from sugar cane, compressed
natural gas, liquefied natural gas, electricity, and hydrogen. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17,
§ 95486(b).
5. Id.
6. CARB, FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS 479 (2009).
7. Patrick Jacobi, Note, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability
Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 30 VT. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2006).
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out” a portion of energy that a provider must obtain from in-state distributed
generation.”8
Both the LCFS and RPSs, then, include some form of discrimination
based on location, often distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state
production. The question is whether this can survive dormant Commerce
Clause challenge under the current doctrine—or whether the doctrine
should be recast with climate change in mind.
B. Overview of Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
The history of the dormant commerce clause is one of shifting categories
and a growing, though often unexamined, belief in the desirability of a
single market unconstrained by state borders. It has been this belief, more
than the words of the Constitution itself, which has driven the doctrine.
In Article I, Section 8, the Constitution simply states that Congress
shall have the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Contemporary
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence holds that, because Congress is
vested with the power to regulate inter-state commerce, the states must be
divested of it. But of course this does not logically follow from the
Constitution’s words, and indeed such an interpretation was relatively late
in coming.
It wasn’t until 1851, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens9, that the Supreme
Court began fashioning dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Even
then, the vesting of Commerce Clause power in Congress was not held to
deprive the states of all power to regulate interstate commerce. As the
Court opined: “It is the opinion of a majority of the court that the mere
grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, did not deprive the
States of power to regulate pilots, and that although Congress had
legislated on this subject, its legislation manifests an intention, with a
single exception, not to regulate this subject, but to leave its regulation to
the several states.”10 Essentially, Cooley established two distinct areas in
interstate commerce: an exclusive zone and a concurrent zone. The
exclusive zone includes matters that necessitate a national-level rule;
consequently this zone is off-limits to states. The concurrent zone included
matters of a more local concern; assuming Congress has not chosen to
take action in the particular arena being governed, states are entitled to

8. Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43
ENVTL. L. 295, 298 (2013).
9. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
10. Id. at 320.
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regulate the matter as they see fit. In Cooley, the state of Pennsylvania
was essentially guaranteeing business for a local industry. The Court
allowed this burden to commerce because Congress had not initiated any
regulation of the industry practices in question.
After Cooley, courts struggled with how to tell what zone a particular
subject matter was in, and what exactly a state could regulate. Over time
the courts began fashioning a “direct vs. indirect” test, whereby a state’s
“direct” regulation of interstate commerce was void, while a regulation
that has mere “indirect” effects on interstate commerce was not void.11
Courts also distinguished between “commerce” and other activities such
as “manufacturing” 12 or “production.” 13 Over time, however, these
distinctions proved unworkable. In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme
Court finally put them to rest, holding that “questions of the power of
Congress are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would
give controlling force to nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and
foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon
interstate commerce.”14
11. See A.L.A. Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–47 (1935).
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the
federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and
the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance
of the federal government. Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of
the state’s commercial facilities would be subject to federal control. . . . The
development of local resources and the extension of local facilities may have a
very important effect upon communities less favored, and to an appreciable
degree alter the course of trade. The freedom of local trade may stimulate interstate
commerce, while restrictive measures within the police power of the state, enacted
exclusively with respect to internal business, as distinguished from interstate
traffic, may in their reflex or indirect influence diminish the latter and reduce
the volume of articles transported into or out of the state. . . . the fact that there
may be an indirect effect upon interstate commerce does not subject the parties
to the federal statute, notwithstanding its broad provisions. This principle has
frequently been applied in litigation growing out of labor disputes. Id.
12. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888) (“Manufacture is transformationthe fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of commerce are
different. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce;
and the regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense embraces the regulation at least
of such transportation.“).
13. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (“production is not
commerce; but a step in preparation for commerce.” (citing Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291
U.S. 584, 587 (1934))).
14. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
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The evolution of the doctrine, then, was as much a function of the
unworkability of the early categories as of their undesirability. The early
doctrine was considered too indeterminate, too easily manipulatable, and
also anathema to the rapid nationalization of commerce that was considered
so important to American society.15 In other words, the doctrine was not
the inevitable or logical product of the Constitution’s words, but rather an
expression of courts’ and society’s needs. As those needs changed, so did
the doctrine.
After Wickard, courts adopted a framework that subjects all state
regulation that facially discriminates against out-of-state entities to strict
scrutiny. The Court saw such facial discrimination as akin to “economic
isolation” and “protectionism.” 16 Moreover, “where simple economic
protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of
invalidity has been erected.”17 A facially discriminatory state law will
only be upheld if the state can show that “the discrimination is demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”18 This
requires the state to show that there is a “legitimate local purpose” and
that no nondiscriminatory means are adequate to fulfill that purpose.19
This has proven to be a barrier that few state laws can overcome.20
Even if a state law does not facially discriminate against out-of-state
commerce, it still may face strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce
Clause if it has either a discriminatory effect or a discriminatory purpose. As
one court has put it: “[a] statutory scheme ‘can discriminate against outof-state interests in three different ways: (a) facially, (b) purposefully, or (c)
in practical effect.’”21 A discriminatory purpose can be gleaned from
legislative history indicating a motivation to protect in-state entities at the
expense of out-of-state entities,22 while a discriminatory effect can be
gleaned from comparing the effects on in-state and out-of-state entities
under the law. 23 In each of these cases, courts must judge whether
15. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537–38 (“[The] principle
that our economic unit is the Nation . . . has as its corollary that the states are not separable
economic units”).
16. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978).
17. Id. at 624.
18. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
19. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
20. See Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43
ENVTL. L. 295, 301 (2013).
21. Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Brown, 567 F.3d
521, 525 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
22. See id. (disagreeing with the District Court’s conclusion that there was a
discriminatory purpose).
23. Id. (holding that there was no discriminatory effect).
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“similarly situated” entities or “like” products are treated differently based on
their location within or without the state.24
Where a law does not discriminate against out-of-state commerce, but
regulates even-handedly, the Court adopts a flexible balancing test that is
much more favorable to state law. “Where the statute regulates
evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”25 However, even under this more flexible test,
state laws that have the effect of favoring local producers over out-of-state
producers have routinely been struck down.26
C. The Vulnerability of State Laws to Dormant
Commerce Clause Challenge
As should be obvious, state LCFS and RPS laws that overtly discriminate
against out-of-state production may have a difficult time surviving dormant
Commerce Clause challenges under the current doctrine. In Wyoming v.
Oklahoma,27 the Supreme Court subjected to strict scrutiny an Oklahoma
law that required in-state utilities to fill 10% of their needs for fuel from
Oklahoma coal. The Court held that the law “expressly reserves a
segment of the Oklahoma coal market for Oklahoma-mined coal, to the
exclusion of coal mined in other States,” and that “[s]uch a preference for
coal from domestic sources cannot be characterized as anything other than
protectionist and discriminatory, for the Act purports to exclude coal
mined in other States based solely on its origin.”28
Indeed, at the District Court level, California’s LCFS was struck down
for precisely this reason. First, the court held that California and Midwest
ethanol were “like products”: “the ethanol made in the Midwest and
California are physically and chemically identical when ultimately mixed

24. Id. (holding that there was no discriminatory effect where in-state and out-ofstate opticians were treated the same, and the law treated opticians differently from
optometrists and ophthalmologists, because opticians, on the one hand, and optometrists
and ophthalmologists, on the other hand, were “not similarly situated.”).
25. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
26. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1951); Baldwin v. G. A.
F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 526–27 (1935).
27. 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
28. Wyoming v. Okla., 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992).
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with petroleum.”29 The court clearly judged the identity of each product
by simply looking at the product itself, not by looking at how it was made
or transported. Then the court held that the LCFS, by assigning different
carbon intensities to Midwest ethanol versus California ethanol,
“differentiate[s] among ethanol pathways based on originFalse”30 The
court held that, even though part of the higher carbon intensity assigned
to Midwest ethanol was a function of transportation, this was nonetheless a
“factor[] that discriminate[s] based on location,” and that “CARB may not
impose a barrier to interstate commerce based on the distance that the
product must travel in interstate commerce.”31
Before the Ninth Circuit, however, the different carbon intensities were
viewed under a much different lens. While the Court acknowledged that
“ethanol from every source has ‘identical physical and chemical
properties,’”32 this was not the end of its analysis. The Court noted that
the different ethanol pathways—the “lifecycle” carbon intensities assigned to
different sources of ethanol—are “based on scientific data, not an
ungrounded presumption that unfairly prejudices out-of-state ethanol.”33
The Court noted that “[i]f we ignore these real differences between ethanol
pathways, we cannot understand whether the challenged regulation responds
to genuine threats of harm or to the mere out-of-state status of an ethanol
pathway. All factors that affect carbon intensity are critical to determining
whether the Fuel Standard gives equal treatment to similarly situated
fuels.”34
Implicit in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis is that whether a fuel is “similarly
situated” depends not only on the physical or chemical properties of the
fuel, but also how that fuel is made. Indeed, much of the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion consists of the Court discussing California’s reasonable decision
to treat ethanol sources differently, by virtue of their carbon intensity, in
order to combat climate change. In essence the Court views CARB’s
efforts through a “climate change lens” and suggests that treating otherwise
“like” products differently is not only a reasonable, but perhaps also a
necessary element of state efforts. As the Court noted, the dormant
Commerce Clause is not “a blindfold” and “does not invalidate by strict

29. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D. Cal.
2011).
30. Id. at 1087.
31. Id. at 1089.
32. See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 2013 U.S.App. LEXIS 19258, at 40
(9th Cir. 2013).
33. Id. at 42.
34. Id.
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scrutiny state laws or regulations that incorporate state boundaries for
good and non-discriminatory reason.”35
II. THE CLIMATE CHANGE LENS
A. The Importance of Differential Local Effects
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey raises many important questions, including whether courts are
prepared to view dormant Commerce Clause challenges through a climate
change lens. One important threshold issue is whether any individual state
can have a “legitimate local public interest” in combatting global
warming. On the one hand, global warming caused by greenhouse gas
emissions is obviously a global problem that requires a global solution.
Even considering the United States on its own, greenhouse gas emissions are
a collective problem. For example, if one state or region massively
increases its GHG emissions, that would negate any reductions in other
states or regions. Thus, one can argue that global warming, to the extent
it is not purely a global problem, and is a U.S. problem, is inherently a
national or federal problem. From this vantage, one could argue that the
citizenry of no individual State—and hence no State government, no
State—has any particular or special interest in global warming and
addressing it. All United States citizens have an interest in global warming
and thus no State has a special or particular interest a distinctive State
interest.
The United States Supreme, however, disavowed this argument, which
was squarely put to it in Massachusetts v. EPA, and affirmed that states
do and can have an individual interest in combatting global warming. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court addressed the question whether a State
such as Massachusetts or California had standing to sue the federal
government for allegedly violating the Clean Air Act directive to regulate
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses as air “pollutants.” Writing
for the Court, Justice Kennedy affirmed that a State as a State suffers a
particularized injury from global warming because it may suffer particular
adverse effects, and thus has an interest, a particular interest, in restraining or
reducing greenhouse gas emissions:

35.

Id. at 1107.
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That these climate-change risks are “widely shared” does not minimize
Massachusetts’ interest in the outcome of this litigation . . . . According to
petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea levels rose somewhere between 10
and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming. . . . These
rising seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. . . . Because
the Commonwealth “owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,”
id., at 171 (declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom P 4), it has alleged a particularized
injury in its capacity as a landowner. The severity of that injury will only increase
over the course of the next century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted,
one Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of coastal property
will be “either permanently lost through inundation or temporarily lost through
periodic storm surge and flooding events.” . . . . Remediation costs alone,
petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

Massachusetts v. EPA thus holds that that a State, acting on behalf of
its the citizens of a State has a particularized interest in how much greenhouse
gas emissions will be on a national scale as a result of federal law. It would
seem to follow that the State also has a particularized interest in how much
greenhouse gas emissions can be attributed to the citizens of the States,
because those emissions are also logically tied to the possible particularized
injuries would or could suffer from global warming. Indeed, a State would
seem to have even more legitimate standing to address emissions attached to
its own citizens, as opposed to those generated nationally, precisely
because the State’s citizens are closer to and more intimately connected
to the State than they are the federal government and federal law.
Massachusetts v. EPA thus arguably implies that a State can take actions
to limit or reduce the greenhouse gas emissions attributable to its citizens.
But that does not necessary answer the question of exactly what scope of
actions the State may take to accomplish that purpose. That is a central
issue posed by California’s LCFS and the litigation it has spawned. As
noted supra, under California law, a carbon weighting is assigned to fuels
used in California based on estimate of the lifetime carbon emissions
associated with the fuel. Thus, transportation-related emissions factor
into the carbon weighting, including emissions related to moving the
feedstocks to the fuel production plant and emissions related to moving the
fuel to the end consumers in California. Midwestern ethanol producers
argued that the inclusion of transportation-related emissions discriminated
against Midwestern-produced ethanol and in favor of California-produced
ethanol. The Midwestern ethanol producers argued that their ethanol was
identical to California ethanol, and hence a like product for purposes of
the Dormant Commerce Clause purposes, and the District Court
adamantly agreed: although the District Court acknowledged that this was
not a classic case of economic protectionism, “physically and chemically
identical ethanol” could not be differentially treated under the applicable
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strict scrutiny standard for facial discrimination against like products.36
This view, in a certain way, makes sense: the California ethanol used in
California will produce when it is burned exactly the same greenhouse gas
emissions in California as the Midwestern ethanol, and the Midwestern
ethanol emissions will have the same marginal impact on global warming
and on the effects of warming on California as the emissions from the
California ethanol.
The question, though, is whether it is reasonable for California to consider
the lifecycle emissions of ethanol used by Californians in California as an
essential attribute of the ethanol, given that those lifecycle emissions are
ultimately the but for result of actions by Californians purchasing and use
decisions, and those lifecycle emissions will have an incremental effect on
global warming and on the effects of global warming in California. We think
the answer has to be yes, primarily because the two different kinds of
ethanol are different products vis-a-vis California because they translate
into different levels of greenhouse gas emissions and different
anticipatable greenhouse gas emission impacts in California. It is, of
course, true that there is no way of knowing that the greater emissions
from any one product rather than another will affect global warming or
affect the impacts of warming on California, as global warming is a global
commons problem characterized by good deal of uncertainty. But
Massachusetts v. EPA stands for the proposition that a state has a legitimate
interest in global warming because it faces the possibility of adverse
impacts in the state notwithstanding the global common and high
uncertainty scientific characteristics of the global warming phenomenon.
Another way of making the same point is to build on the uncontroversial
assumption, held, it seems, even by the challengers of the LCFS, that
California can assign a different carbon weight to a fuel based on the
greenhouse emissions generated by the fuel when it is burned in California.
But if it is true that California can treat as unlike products two products
that will produce different amounts of greenhouse gas emissions in
California, then it seems only logical that California can treat as unlike
two products that have different lifecycle emissions and thus have different
implications for the risk to California of adverse climate change impacts.
Indeed, including lifecycle emissions merely seems to be a more accurate,

36. See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1088 (E.D.
Cal. 2011).
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more precise way for California to address possible adverse climate
change impacts to California.
The fact that California faces possible adverse effects from global
warming helps distinguish this case from others involving lifecyclerelated environmental impacts associated with goods used or consumed
within California. For example, imagine that wine produced in California
involves less water pollution than wine production in Oregon or
Washington or New York, and that California sought to impose a tax or
extra cost on out-of-state wine based on the Clean Water impacts, the
essentially localized impacts, of the wine production in those states. In
that context, California would not be treated products as unlike based on
their potential adverse environmental impacts in California, and thus any
differential treatment of the wines would constitute facial discrimination
subject to strict scrutiny.
As noted supra, this climate change lens on the Dormant Commerce
Clause—the lens that treats products are not like when the products will
have differential contributions to possible adverse environmental impacts
from climate change within the State—appears to be endorsed by the
Ninth Circuit in its opinion reversing the district court:
Unlike these discriminatory statutes, the Fuel Standard does not base its treatment on
a fuel’s origin but on its carbon ROCKY M OUNTAIN F ARMERS 36 U NION
V. C OREY intensity. The Fuel Standard performs lifecycle analysis to measure
the carbon intensity of all fuel pathways. When it is relevant to that measurement,
the Fuel Standard considers location, but only to the extent that location affects
the actual GHG emissions attributable to a default pathway. Under dormant
Commerce Clause precedent, if an out-of-state ethanol pathway does impose
higher costs on California by virtue of its greater GHG emissions, there is a
nondiscriminatory reason for its higher carbon intensity value. See id. Stated
another way, if producers of out-of state ethanol actually cause more GHG
emissions for each unit produced, because they use dirtier electricity or less
efficient plants, CARB can base its regulatory treatment on these emissions. If
California is to successfully promote low carbon-intensity fuels, countering a
trend towards increased GHG output and rising world temperatures, it cannot
ignore the real factors behind GHG emissions.

What is unclear is whether the Ninth Circuit panel’s embrace of this
lens ultimately will hold, as the case continues to be litigated, and whether
the Ninth Circuit’s perspective will gain support by other panels of that
Court and by other courts. That issue is currently implicated by the lawsuit
North Dakota has brought against Minnesota regarding Minnesota’s ban
on the import of most energy from out-of-state new coal-fired plants. The
Minnesota litigation raises different issues than the California litigation in
many respects, one of which is that Minnesota is not seeking to treat instate energy sources differently from out-of-state energy sources but rather
is seeking to ban both new energy production from coal generation in
Minnesota and long-term contracts for import of energy from new coal
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generation, and California is seeking to calibrate the environmental costs
of carbon via a de facto tax or charge whereas Minnesota is using the
blunter instrument of a ban on energy from certain forms of production
and certain facilities. What makes the two lawsuit similar is that
Minnesota’s premise in the legislation at issue—that its citizens have a
legitimate stake in reducing GHG emissions attributable to them and thus
have a right to enact policies to that end—is also California’s premise in
the legislation at issue.37
B. Local Environmental Benefits
Different forms of energy production in a given state have different
environmental consequences within such state. Coal-power electricity
plants and wind farms, for example, have dramatically different local
effects.38 Coal plants, especially older ones, generate a range of localized
pollutants that have real environmental and public health consequences
and, among other thing, may affect a State’s ability and costs of complying
with the federal Clean Air Act. Wind farms, essentially, generate no
pollution, and pose no adverse health risks. It is reasonable to assume that
local clean energy will crowd out, displace, local “dirty” energy to at least
some extent: where clean energy production is introduced into a state and
meets a local demand previously met by dirtier energy, the dirty energy
producer may continue to do business as before, by exporting energy it is
currently providing to meet local demand, but it may well find that the
demand for its energy has been reduced and that it will therefore need to
reduce or even eliminate production. Thus, on net, the development of
local energy predictably serves the goal of improving local environmental
conditions by reducing the net pollution associated with local energy
production.
But why would the displacement of dirty local energy and corresponding
environmental benefits be more secure when new in-state clean sources
are established, and less secure when clean energy can be imported from

37. See David Shaffer, Judge raises questions about Minnesota’s anti-coal law,
STARTRIBUNE (Oct. 17, 2013, 9:19 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/22
8274571.html
38. See, e.g., Scott Malone, Coal’s Hidden Costs Top $345 Billion in U.S.-Study,
Reuters, (Feb. 16, 2011, 11:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/usa-coalstudyidUSN1628366220110216 (discussing the high environmental and public health costs
of coal).
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different sources under the RPS? For one thing, the same users who rely
on dirty local production may want other local energy production as a
replacement because, all else being equal, local sources may be more
secure and reliable against interruption as well as possibly less expensive.
Moreover, once new local renewable capacity has been established, it is a
political reality that it is more likely to be permanent because the local
renewable industry as a result will have a political voice and will advocate for
the continuation of renewable energy requirements; the same political
entrenchment effects is not achieved where renewable energy production
is based out-of-state.39 While the displacement effects vary from state to
state and case to case, and continue to be studied by scholars, it may well be
reasonable for a State Legislature to assume that building local clean
energy capacity will push the overall mix of in-state energy production
away from the pollutant-intensive end of the spectrum and toward the
pollutant free end more reliably than allowing in-State users to meet
renewable requirements solely through imported energy. To make the
point another way, local clean energy is not a like product to out-of-state
clean energy because the former results in a plausibly more reliable reduction
in localized pollutants than the latter.
It is of course true that a State might seek to eliminate dirty local
sources of energy in more direct ways by, for example, adding to state
local environmental requirements such that the dirtier sources could no
longer operate. But outside of the realm of strict scrutiny, a State need
not establish that it is taking the only or a necessary means to achieve a
legitimate state objective, such as reducing pollution and bringing the
State into compliance with its State Implementation Plan under the Clean
Air Act. When State legislation is not under strict scrutiny, a State has a
broad range of choices under post-Lochner rational basis review as to how
to achieve reducing local dirty energy, and thereby improve
environmental quality and local health conditions. A court’s role is not to
second-guess those particular choices. And if we accept the proposition that
imported clean energy and local clean energy are not like products
because they will have differing effects in terms of displacing dirty local
39. Entrenchment of a policy—here a policy favoring renewables as a part of the
state energy mix—by one sitting legislature is an accepted commonplace, even if it does
constitute a fundamental puzzle problem for democratic theory. See David A. Dana &
Susan Koniak, Bargaining For Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 531–32 (1999)
(reviewing literature on entrenchment and democracy and the question when one legislature
can effectively tie the hands of subsequent ones). For example, if one legislature votes to
adopt pollution control measures that effectively force existing coal plants in the state to
close, that in practice entrenches an anti- or no-coal position, as the next legislature cannot
readily bring the coal plants back once they have closed even if it repeals the pollution
control measures.
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energy, then we are in the realm of non-strict scrutiny, in which case the
State enjoys broad choice in terms of how to go about improving local
environmental conditions.
C. Adaptation
Another benefit of viewing Dormant Commerce Clause cases through
a climate change lens is that it brings into focus the climate vulnerabilities of
cross-state energy transmission and the concomitant benefits of local
production. Here, too, the state may have a legitimate interest in global
warming—in this case an interest in its own climate resiliency and the
vulnerability of its own population to power disruptions. To serve this
interest, a state may reasonably conclude that it must foster more local
energy production.
In July 2013, the U.S. Department of Energy published a report that
outlined vulnerabilities in far-flung, cross-state energy transmission
systems. For example, the report noted that “[i]ncreasing temperatures
are expected to increase transmission losses, reduce current carrying
capacity, increases stresses on the distribution system, and decrease
substation efficiency and lifespan.”40 The report noted that transmission
line capacity could decrease by 7%-8% under a 9 degree F warming
scenario, and that system transmission losses during heat waves could be
significant, like the 2006 heat wave that caused electric power transformers
to fail in Missouri and New York or the July 2006 heat wave which caused
more than 2,000 distribution line transformers in California to fail, causing a
loss of power to approximately 1.3 million customers.41 In addition, since
2000, there has been a steady increase in damage to electric transmission
and distribution lines from extreme storms, and “[a] Congressional
Research Service report estimates that storm-related power outages cost
the U.S. economy $20-$55 billion annually.”42
While the report also highlights the vulnerabilities of renewable resources
such as solar or wind power, the fact remains that for any given mix of
energy production, local sources will always be more climate-resilient

40. See U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY SECTOR VULNERABILITIES TO CLIMATE
CHANGE AND EXTREME WEATHER, July 2013, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/07/
f2/20130716-Energy%20Sector%20Vulnerabilities%20Report.pdf.
41. Id. at 12–13.
42. Id. at 35.
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than distant sources.43 In other words, states may have a legitimate interest
in making themselves more climate resilient—indeed, for many states,
adaptation measures will soon become of paramount importance—and a
reasonable strategy to accomplish this could include fostering more local
energy production. Local energy production not only reduces transmission
vulnerabilities, but if local energy producers are generally smaller and
more widely dispersed, they may also serve as a valuable bulwark against
disproportionate climate shocks—weather events that strike certain areas
harder than others. This is because, where energy production is centralized,
a single weather event could compromise power to a large swath of
population (as shown by the examples in the U.S. DOE report, cited
supra). On the other hand, where energy production is dispersed, that
single weather event would adversely affect a smaller percentage of overall
power generation, and thus a smaller percentage of the population. In
other words, states may have a “good and non-discriminatory reason,” in
the words of the Ninth Circuit that is grounded in climate change adaptation,
for favoring local production of energy.
III. SUPPORT FOR THE CLIMATE CHANGE LENS
A. WTO Jurisprudence
Judicial support for this evolving climate change lens comes in various
forms. First, as noted supra, the Ninth Circuit has already looked
beyond a product’s superficial “likeness” in deciding whether a state has
discriminated based on a product’s location. But this decision comes
against the backdrop of other evolving judicial views.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) enforces the international freetrade regime that is based on the same principles as the dormant Commerce
Clause—preventing individual states from discriminating against products
by virtue of where those products originate. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article I provides, in pertinent part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of
payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such
duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with
importation and exportation . . . any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like

43. A counter-argument would arise if distant sources were more climate resilient
than local sources—if, say, Midwestern ethanol (or coal, for that matter) were more resilient to
extreme weather than California ethanol—but given the transmission vulnerabilities, such
a scenario seems unlikely.
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product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties.44

In other words, products originating in all countries are entitled to the
most favorable treatment accorded to “like” products originating in any
other nation. This principle is repeated in the GATT’s affirmative obligation
known as national treatment on internal taxation and regulation under
GATT Article III. Article III.4 requires that “[t]he products of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.”45
What constitutes a “like” product has been a controversial issue under
GATT for many years. Initially, GATT dispute settlement panels adopted a
restrictive or “narrow” interpretation of like products, much like many
domestic dormant Commerce Clause cases, in which products are “alike” if
they have the same physical characteristics, regardless of the processes or
production methods (PPM) by which they are made.46 The best-known
example of this “narrow” view of likeness was espoused in United States–
Restrictions on Importation of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin I), in which Mexico
challenged United States restrictions on tuna imports. The U.S. Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 set standards to limit dolphin mortality
from tuna fishing and required tuna-importing countries to prove that they
met the dolphin protection standards of U.S. law.47 In practice, this meant
that the exporting country’s tuna fleet could not use purse seine nets. Such
nets encircled dolphins known to swim with tuna and then captured
everything inside them, killing large numbers of dolphins in the process.
The GATT dispute settlement panel struck down the United States’
tuna import restrictions. 48 It agreed with Mexico that “regulations
governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the taking of tuna could

44.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1226 (4th ed. 2011).
47. See Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Importation of Tuna, WT/
DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991).
48. Id. at 40. The decision was not formally adopted by the GATT parties, but its
interpretation has been influential.
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not possibly affect tuna as a product.” The panel focused on the product
alone: tuna meat obtained through the use of purse seine nets was
physically indistinguishable from tuna meat obtained through dolphinsafe fishing practices. The United States’ measure therefore discriminated
between “like products” and was inconsistent with GATT.
However, much like the evolving dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, this idea of “likeness” as involving only the physical
characteristics of the end product itself has undergone much change before
the WTO. Several years after Tuna-Dolphin, the WTO’s Appellate Body
rejected a purely “narrow” approach, holding that “[n]o one approach [to the
question of ‘likeness’] will be appropriate for all cases” and that a
judgment must be made “on a case-by-case basis.”49 The Appellate Body
noted that the general criteria for assessing “likeness” can include many
factors, such as “(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii)
the end-uses of the products; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits—more
comprehensively termed consumers’ perceptions and behavior—in respect
of the products; and (iv) the tariff classification of the products.”50 In
other words, “likeness” is not simply a function of the product’s physical
properties but can include other things.
Such “other things” can in turn include the health or environmental
effects of how a product is made. For example, regulatory measures can
be justified under Art. XX (b) of the GATT 1994, which reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

This provision was analyzed in United States — Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.51 In that case, India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Thailand alleged that certain trade-related provisions of the
U.S. Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) were inconsistent with Arts. XI
and XX of GATT. The ESA identified five species of endangered or
threatened sea turtles in United States waters and prohibited their hunting,
capture, or killing within the United States’ territorial seas and the high
49. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Related Products, ¶ 101, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
50. Id.
51. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter “Shrimp—Turtle”].
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seas. It required United States shrimp trawlers to use “turtle excluder
devices” (TEDs) in their nets when fishing in waters known to be inhabited
by the sea turtles. It also banned shrimp imports from countries that do
not enforce comparable standards. The Appellate Body, cognizant of the
criticism that the WTO was not meaningfully addressing the issue of
environmental protection, rejected the “narrow” view of “likeness.” It ruled
that the United States could regulate the production methods of domestic
shrimp and shrimp imports. This was true even if the US was “conditioning
access to [its] domestic market on whether exporting Members comply
with, or adopt, a policy or policies [it] unilaterally prescribed.”52 Even under
such circumstances, the US could take advantage of Art. XX(b).53
In other words, the WTO has evolved to recognize that trade
discrimination is not simply a matter of determining whether a “like”
product is treated differently. There is also the question of whether the
trade restriction is “necessary” to protect life or health. As the Appellate
Body stated in the Korea-Beef case (a non-environmental case involving
a claim of necessity under Article XX(d)):
[D]etermination of whether a measure . . . [may] be “necessary” within the
contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in every case a process of weighing and
balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by
the compliance measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the
importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation,
and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.54

The Appellate Body then affirmed this interpretation in the context of
Article XX(b), stating that:
. . .the more vital or important the common interests or values pursued, the easier it
would be to accept as “necessary” measures designed to achieve those ends. In
this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human life
and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and lifethreatening, health risks posed by asbestos fibres. The value pursued is both vital
and important in the highest degree.55

52. Id. ¶ 121.
53. Id.
54. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 164, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
55. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-containing Products, ¶ 172, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
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The Appellate Body later affirmed that “[t]o be characterized as
necessary, a measure does not have to be indispensable.”56 Instead, it
must make a “material” contribution to the objective, and its contribution
“has to be weighed against its trade restrictiveness, taking into account the
importance of the interests or the values underlying the objective pursued
by it.”57 The Appellate Body will also look at whether reasonable
alternatives to the proposed trade restriction exist.58
In sum, WTO jurisprudence has moved away from a simple analysis of
whether “like” products are treated differently, and now incorporates an
explicitly contextual, values-laden approach to determining whether or
not a trade restriction is inconsistent with GATT. It is precisely this sort
of evolution that we suggest for the dormant Commerce Clause—an
evolution that recognizes that the dormant Commerce Clause has never
been a static rule but has changed a great deal over time to respond to the
nation’s changing needs. A state’s response to climate change—arguably the
nation’s greatest challenge yet—should be evaluated with similar broader
goals in mind, and not simply be subject to an automatic and rather
mindless scrutiny of whether or not it discriminates against out-of-state
interests.
B. The Supreme Court’s Recent United Haulers Decision
One of the more recent and substantial changes to the Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine occurred in the context of the Supreme
Court’s decision in United Haulers.59 United Haulers may or may not
represent a real step forward in the Supreme Court’s dormant commerce
jurisprudence, at least with respect to environmental issues. Ultimately,
we will need further Supreme Court case law to answer that question. At
a minimum, however, United Haulers contains enough helpful language that
it opens the door for lower federal courts to push away from a reflexively
rigid interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause in instances in
which legislation appears to be genuinely motivated by environmental
concerns, rather than traditional protectionism.
United Haulers v. Oneida, which was decided “independently of the
market participation precedents,” upheld a “flow control” ordinance
requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a processing plant owned

56. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, ¶ 210, WT/DS332/AB/R (June 12, 2007).
57. Id.
58. See id. ¶ 210.
59. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330
(2007).
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and operated by a public authority in New York State.60 The Court found
that compelling reasons justified “treating these laws differently from
laws favoring particular private businesses over their competitors,” in
particular “[u]nlike private enterprise, government is vested with the
responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens”
and can be presumed to be pursuing non-protectionist objectives,
especially when it was addressing and purporting to satisfy a traditional
government function.61 The Court also emphasized that where the costs
of a regulation fall largely on in-state residents and entities, then
deference to the political process is particularly appropriate: “the most
palpable harm imposed by the ordinances at issue—more expensive trash
removal—will likely fall upon the very people who voted for the laws,”62
rather than out-of-state interests. United Haulers thus set forth three
interrelated, but perhaps independently valid, reasons for allowing what
otherwise might be deemed a facially discriminatory regulation to pass
muster under the Dormant Commerce Clause: first, the entity
benefitting from the regulation is public or State-owned; the regulation
concerns and purports to satisfy a traditional government function,
specifically state or local function; and the burden, or a substantial part of
it, of the regulatory scheme falls on in-state resident and entities who had
resort and have resort to the state political process.63
One year later, the Supreme Court decided Dept. of Revenue of Kentucky
v Davis, which upheld a Kentucky law that exempted Kentucky- issued
municipal bonds from Kentucky state tax while imposing that tax on all
other bonds.64 In Davis, the Court acknowledged that Kentucky was a
market participant as an issuer of local bonds but also was acting as a tax
regulator of both Kentucky and non-Kentucky bonds, but the Court
concluded the role of issuer and tax regulator were so intertwined that the
expanded market participant exception of United Haulers applied.65 The
Davis Court reiterated and endorsed all three ideas contained in the United
Haulers decision—the importance of public ownership, the importance of
traditional government function, and the importance of the costs being
borne largely by in-state residents and entities.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 332.
Id. at 330–32.
Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008).
Id. at 330.
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Applying Haulers and Davis to the LCFS, it seems clear that if California
or any other state actually purchases the power that is then re-sold to
distributors and users within the State, the State can choose to favor lowcarbon fuels in its purchasing and pricing decisions, even if that means
locally-produced fuels are available to in-State users at prices lower than
ones produced far away. The same would be true where a State purchases
electricity and then prices and re-sells it according to a State-selected
formula that includes a portion reserved for in-state-produced renewables.
Some states, such as Illinois, in fact do have energy purchased and then
re-sold by a public entity.
But what about the case where the role of the State is more multifaceted,
as it was in Davis? As in Davis, where the State created a market for local
bonds by issuing them in the context of a larger regional and national market,
a State with a renewable portfolio standard creates a market for renewable
power in the context of larger regional and national energy market. In
both cases the State is central to the market, and if a State can and should
be presumed to be acting for legitimate public purposes when it issues
local bonds and then exempts them from tax, why shouldn’t the same
presumption apply when a State establishes a renewable energy market
and then allocates a share of that market to in-state production?
The other rationales of United Haulers and Davis seem applicable to
the LCFS and RPS cases as well. Providing electricity and regulating rates
arguably are traditional state government functions, albeit ones with a
federal overlay.66 Moreover, protecting the State and its people from
environmental harm from greenhouse gasses and conventional pollutants
is absolutely within the domain of traditional public health and welfare,
police power concerns.67 Finally, with both the LCFS and RPS, much of
the costs of favoring low-carbon fuels and in-state-produced renewables
are borne by in-state business and residential consumers, to the extent
these requirements mean that they pay higher electricity costs than they
otherwise would. Just as in United Haulers with respect to New Yorkers’

66. FERC v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742 (1982), which affirms the federal role in energy
markets and federal constitutional power to have an extensive role, is not inconsistent with
the idea that states have considerable traditional authority in this arena. Indeed, the very
idea that States can have a Renewable Portfolio Standard at all, and that that fact by itself
is assumed to be constitutionally and by and large politically unproblematic, confirms the
widespread acceptance of a major state role. To my knowledge, in every State, retail rates
are set by a State agency.
67. This, too, is uncontroversial. Indeed, under our system of cooperative federalism,
even when there is an applicable federal statute, it is generally not read to preempt state
authority and states, in practice, are often at the lead in addressing environmental problems
under cooperative federalism.
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waste disposal rates, it is Californians who pay the higher energy costs
when the State of California uses lifecycle weightings for fuels.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, while the dormant Commerce Clause has the potential for
undermining recent state efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
courts should—and perhaps are—moving away from a rigid definition of
discrimination against “like” products. This move would allow courts to
conduct a more contextual analysis of state measures to encourage
alternative fuel production through low carbon fuel standards or renewable
energy portfolio standards.
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